A filosofia alemã do século XIX posterior a Hegel está bastante estudada em três direções. A primeira, que surge da luta entre hegelianos de esquerda e direita, acaba por conduzir ao materialismo e ao marxismo; a segunda, que se expressa na vertente irracionalista e anti-sistemática, passa por Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard e Nietzsche; a terceira é constituída pelo neo-kantismo e suas derivações, cuja versão oficial teria suas raízes fincadas pelo famoso discurso inaugural de Zeller e pelo livro de Otto Liebmann, que deram (...) o impulso ao movimento “Zurück zu Kant”. Em tal visão de conjunto, o grande ausente é um movimento contínuo, ainda quando irregular e multifacetado, que terminará conduzindo à filosofia contemporânea. Este movimento tem em Trendelenburg uma figura chave. É com suas “Investigações Lógicas” que se inicia a reformulação das relações entre filosofia e ciência e, neste sentido, o verdadeiro retorno a Kant. O fato de sua obra principal ter exatamente o mesmo nome que a coleção de ensaios temáticos de Frege, a obra de ruptura de Husserl e as dissertações de doutorado de Cohen, Dilthey e Brentano significa algo mais que curiosas coincidências. “Zurück zu Kant” (Adolf Trendelenburg the overcoming of idealism and the roots of contemporary philosophy)Considering history of philosophy as a whole, the two main traditions of thought from the 20th century (analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic) can be regarded as being variants of one same fundamental turn. This systematic relation is connected to a common historical root. To highlight it implies to review the ideas that are deeply in the basis of the historiography of the German thought in the 19th century. Beyond names, problems and theses that may appear to have at first sight no relationship whatsoever, we can notice a continuous unitary development that has not yet received all the attention it deserves. In this movement, Adolf Trendelenburg stands out, once the beginners of both the abovementioned traditions and of neokantianism (Frege, Brentano, Dilthey and Cohen) received a decisive impulse from his reflections. (shrink)

Twentieth-century philosophy split into two traditions that often, at least as a matter of fact, regard each other as incommensurable. The last twenty years pointed to the reversal of this trend. This article can be seen as a contribution to that tendency, in so far as, in it, a new approach to the contemporary reflexion as a whole is proposed: logical analysis and phenomenology- hermeneutics are different sides of one and the same turn in the history of philosophy. Such reading (...) not only recovers philosophy's lost unity, but also throws light on its continuity with history of philosophy.La filosofía del siglo XX se ha escindido en dos tradiciones que, a menudo y, las mas de las veces puramente de fato, se consideran inconmensurables. Los últimos veinte años parecen anunciar la reversión de esta tendencia. El presente trabajo efectúa un aporte en tal dirección, en la medida en que propone un nuevo modo de considerar la reflexión contemporánea en su conjunto: análisis lógico y fenomenología-hermenéutica son aspectos de un único y mismo giro en la historia de la filosofía. De este modo, no solo se rescata la unidad del pensamiento contemporáneo, sino que se ilumina su continuidad con la historia de la filosofía. (shrink)

Para Frege, o erro de base do psicologismo é a sua concepção de sujeito, que se concentra no princípio de que meus únicos objetos são conteúdos imanentes da consciência. Entretanto, essa tese não é meramente falsa, mas também refutável. A refutação da mesma aparece, não obstante, tardiamente em Der Gedanke. É esse o sentido último da crítica do idealismo oferecida neste texto. Ela é um passo necessário e imprescindível para assegurar a possibilidade de que captemos pensamentos, possibilidade com a qual (...) se ocupa boa parte do artigo de 1918. (shrink)

To determine the place that corresponds to a particular author in the process called “the dispute about psychologism” (“Psychologismusstreit”), it is necessary to go beyond his express statements about the relationship between psychology and logic, and pay attention to his statements regarding subjectivity. In the following lines, this general principle is applied to Herbart, which will make it possible to determine the place he occupies in the dispute and clarify the relationship in which he finds himself with respect to other (...) better-known and paradigmatic authors of said dispute, such as Frege. (shrink)

There is an evolution in the Fregean critique of psycho-logism, and the differences between the 1884 and the 1893 stances, when the revision of a psychologistic theory of subjectivity starts to be founded, are particularly relevant.

It is well known that Frege separates drastically logic from psychology. Now, if we consider carefully which is the task Frege accords to psychology, we see three things, that is, first that in reality it consists not in one but in several tasks; second that in some cases it is just doubtful whether psychology can handle them and, finally, third that Frege, even if it seems the contrary, has said relevant things with respect to the aforementioned questions. From the latter (...) it follows that Frege’s drastic separation between logic and psychology does not contradict the fact that he has a clear conception of subjectivity which is intentional and not naturalistic. (shrink)

La crítica al psicologismo juega un papel igualmente esencial en los orígenes de neokantianismo, fenomenología y filosofía analítica. Este trabajo se propone estudiar el desarollo de tal crítica en la filosofía analítica correlacionando el mismo a aquel que se opera en el neokantianismo y en la fenomenología. Bajo tal perspectiva, son revisadas ciertas consideraciones anacrónicas con respecto a autores tales como Frege y Moore.

ABSTRACT Beneke’s name has been inextricably linked to the concept of psychologism and, by decorum, to the decisive criticism that the Husserlian Prolegomena directed at this movement. In this text we try to offer a more diferentiated vision of his philosophy, considering aspects of his thought that are now forgotten and placing them within the tradition of the psychological method. In this way, perspectives are opened not only for the understanding of the aforementioned tradition, but also for a consideration of (...) psychologism and Psychologismusstreit more appropriate to the historical-philosophical reality and less unilaterally influenced by the authority of Husserl. (shrink)

Para Frege, o erro de base do psicologismo é a sua concepção de sujeito, que se concentra no princípio de que meus únicos objetos são conteúdos imanentes da consciência. Entretanto, essa tese não é meramente falsa, mas também refutável. A refutação da mesma aparece, não obstante, tardiamente em Der Gedanke. É esse o sentido último da crítica do idealismo oferecida neste texto. Ela é um passo necessário e imprescindível para assegurar a possibilidade de que captemos pensamentos, possibilidade com a qual (...) se ocupa boa parte do artigo de 1918. (shrink)

It is well known that the discussion concerning the relations between content and object is a central theme in Brentano’s school after the decisive essay by Twardowski in 1894. However, less known is the fact that this discussion also takes place outside the aforementioned school and that the distinction between content and object is already present before 1893 amongst other authors.

A crítica de Frege ao psicologismo evoluiu ao longo do tempo. O ponto principal desta evolução é a passagem da crítica do psicologismo em “Fundamentos da aritmética” àquela das “Leis básicas da aritmética”. O papel determinante nesta passagem se dá a partir da crítica que Frege recebeu de Kerry.

Hacaracterizadopor filosofia contemporânea a presença de um dualismo entre esquizóide tradição fenomenológica e hermenêutica analítico tradicional. A origem histórica do que pode ser fixado no Congresso Davos, que, aliás, marca o início da negligência de outro programa, a filosofia das formas simbólicas de E. Cassirer e hoje pode ser considerado como uma direção alternativa e possível para a superação do dualismo mencionados. Tal, em breve, a posição defendida por M. Friedman em sua monografia recente, escrito no contexto da convicção de (...) uma crise resultante do esgotamento das tradições e subsequente necessidade de reorientação. O texto oferece um estudo crítico diz Friedman, mostrando onde e como ele pode e deve ser concluída ou, se necessário, corrigidos. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos proponemos comparar las teorías de la subjetividad de Natorp y Brentano. Resultado de esta comparación será evidenciar una absoluta incompatibilidad entre ambas, incompatibilidad que debe ser fijada a partir de sus propios conceptos básicos, a saber, intencionalidad y conciencialidad (Bewusstheit), los cuales, contra lo que podría pensarse, no son ni equivalentes ni paralelos, sino que responden a concepciones irreconciliables, principalmente en el modo en que cada uno de ellos se sitúa con respecto a la noción de (...) conciencia y a la tradición cartesiana moderna. (shrink)

La remisión del problema relativo al como de la captación de pensamientos a la psicología por parte de Frege ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración subjetiva está ausente en este autor. La crítica fregueana al psicologismo, sin embargo, se concentra en una crítica a la concepción psicologista de subjetividad y, correlativamente, implica una concepción de subjetividad novedosa en el contexto de la filosofía alemana de la segunda mitad del s. XIX que, (...) como la husserliana, es no-naturalística e intencional.The assignment to psychology by Frege of the problem concerning how a thought is grasped has made the idea that all subjective considerations are absent from this author's work a dominant one amongst its critics. The fregean critic of psychologism, however, focusses on a critic of the psychologistic conception of the subjectivity and accordingly implies a conception of the subjective that is new in the context of the German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century and that is, like Husserl´s, non- naturalistic and intentional. (shrink)

É bem sabido que a discussão das relações entre conteúdo e objeto é um tema central na escola de Brentano após o decisivo ensaio de Twardowski de 1894. Todavia, pouco sabido é o fato de que esta discussão também tem lugar fora da escola mencionada e que a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto já está presente em outros autores antes de 1894.

Resumo: Nesta exposiçáo proponho efetuar uma apresentaçáo dos problemas interpretativos fundamentais e das diferentes leituras que se tem realizado em relaçáo à filosofia das formas simbólicas cassireriana. Palabvas chaves: Cassirer. Filosofia das formas simbólicas. Formas simbólicas.

La crisis de la ciencia europea es un tema presente en la filosofia alemana luego del fracaso del idealismo alemán. Esa crisis encuentra una expresión decisiva en la filosofia de Hermann Lotze, autor extremamente influyente en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y que actúa como referencia e inspiración para las reflexiones husserlianas de la década de 1930.

Contemporary philosophy has been characterized by the presence of a schizoid dualism between the analytic tradition and the fenomenologic-hermeneutic tradition. Its historical origin can be set in the Davos Congress, which sets off the beginning of the oblivion of another program, the philosophy of symbolic forms, proposed by E. Cassirer, and which nowadays can be considered as an alternative and possible surpassing direction of the above-mentioned dualism. That is, in short, the position sustained by M. Friedman in his recent monograph, (...) written in the context of the conviction of a crisis derived from the depauperation of the traditions and from the subsequent need for a re-orientation. The text offered provides a critical comment of Friedman’s study, showing the point from which it can and must be completed and eventually corrected, and how its completion and correction are to be done.La filosofía contemporánea se hacaracterizadopor la presencia de un dualismo esquizoide entre la tradición analítica e la tradición fenomenológico hermenéutica. El origen histórico del mismo puede ser fijado en el Congreso de Davos, el cual, por otra parte, señala el comienzo del olvido de un otro programa, la filosofía de las formas simbólicas de E. Cassirer e que hoy puede ser considerado como alternativa e posible dirección de superación del dualismo mencionado. Tal es, en síntesis, la posición defendida por M. Friedman en su reciente monografía, escrita en el contexto de la convicción de una crisis derivada del agotamiento de las tradiciones y de la subsecuente necesidad de una reorientación. El texto que ofrecemos comenta críticamente el estudio de Friedman, mostrando donde y cómo él puede y debe ser completado o, eventualmente, corregido. (shrink)

La filosofía analítica ha experimentado mudanzas radicales en las últimas décadas, una de las cuales es su interés por la metafísica. El entusiasmo por el tema, sin embargo, ha impedido ver esta mudanza en perspectiva histórico-filosófica y, de este modo, reflexionar adecuadamente su significado. Mas tal vez haya llegado el momento de comenzar a entender este fenómeno, llamando para ello la atención sobre la renovación que experimenta la metafísica pós-kantiana en el siglo XIX, renovación en la cual Brentano participa de (...) modo decisivo. Mas, si el interés por la metafísica analítica termina remitiendo a Brentano, este, por su vez, remite a un contexto peculiar, hoy totalmente olvidado, referente a las relaciones entre metafísica y psicología en el siglo XIX, el cual estuvo indisociablemente vinculado al programa del “método psicológico.” En tanto la importancia decisiva del “método psicológico” en el ámbito del desarrollo de la lógica y epistemología ha sido intensamente estudiada, poca o ninguna atención ha merecido el papel jugado por el mismo en el desarrollo de la metafísica. La presente contribución se dirige a subsanar esa carencia. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece una re-lectura del ensayo de Moore “The refutation of idealism” que, oponiéndose a lo que es la tendencia mayoritaria, llama la atención sobre el hecho de que la crítica al idealismo remite en Moore, en última instancia, a la propuesta de una teoría de la subjetividad cuya base es introspectivo-fenomenológica.: In this paper a new reading of Moore’s essay “The refutation of idealism” is offered, which, in opposition to the main trend, stresses the fact that (...) Moore’s criticism of idealism is related ultimately to the proposal of a theory of subjectivity whose foundations are phenomenological and introspective.Keywords: Moore, idealism, subjectivity, phenomenology. (shrink)

Neokantianismo y realismo lógico desenvuelven dos formas de anti-psicologismo diferenciables tanto del punto de vista sistemático como histórico-filosófico. En las siguientes líneas me propongo clarificar el papel jugado por el neokantianismo en el así llamado Psychologismusstreit, intentando poner de manifiesto su peculiaridad.

“The rise of analitic Philosophy” reúne artículos de diferentes autores sobre el tema anunciado em su título. De hecho, la obra se revela como uma crítica a la posición tradicional defendida por Dummet, negándose, por ejemplo, um vínculo essencial entre filosofia analítica y linguistic turn. Sin embargo, los trabajos mencionados, em vez de superar la solución dummettiana, permanecen antes de su problema, perdiéndose em consideraciones particulares y siendo incapaces de fijar la unidad de la filosofia analítica desde el punto de (...) vista de la historia de la filosofia. (shrink)

Existe una evolución en la crítica fregueana al psicologismo, siendo de particular relevancia las diferencias que existen entre la posición de 1884 y la de 1893, momento a partir del cual la misma comienza a fundarse en una revisión de la teoría psicologista de la subjetividad.

Frege’s account, according to which the problem of how thoughts are apprehended should be a part of psychology, has led scholars to the idea that every consideration regarding subjectivity is absent in this author. From the latter follows a certain way of conceiving the relation between Frege and Husserl which establishes an absolute chasm between both authors regarding the topic mentioned. In the present contribution an extremely different view is defended, namely, that Frege plays an intermediate role between 19th century (...) Platonism and husserlian phenomenology. The main focus of the argument is the commitment between naturalism and idealism which characterizes Platonism before Frege and the beginning of its overcoming carried out by him. (shrink)

Talvez “redescobrimento” seja uma caracterização adequada para designar o _status_ do movimento neokantiano atualmente. Se, por um lado, o neokantismo tem recebido uma maior atenção em diversos lugares da Europa, América do norte, Ásia, e em alguns países da América Latina, por outro, na ainda jovem cultura filosófica brasileira, o estudo desse importante e decisivo movimento é algo atípico dentro de nossas instituições de ensino, para dizer o mínimo. De fato, a quantidade de trabalhos acadêmicos, artigos e livros sobre as (...) filosofias de autores como Cassirer, Windelband, Cohen, Lask, Natorp, Rickert e tantos outros que fizeram parte desse plural movimento filosófico está muito aquém do que eles realmente merecem. Sem dúvidas, esse “acerto de contas” com tais personagens seria uma tarefa muito mais árdua se não tivéssemos à nossa disposição os _Estudos_ _Neokantianos_, do Professor Mario Ariel González Porta. (shrink)

Using data from 1,352 middle-school Israeli adolescents, the current study examines the interface of spirituality and character strengths and its longitudinal contribution to subjective well-being and prosociality. Participants were approached three times over a 14-months period and completed measures of character strengths, spirituality, subjective well-being (positive emotions, life satisfaction), and prosociality. Findings revealed a fourth-factor structure of character strengths that included the typical tripartite classification of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intellectual strengths together with spirituality emerging as a statistically autonomous factor. Spirituality (...) was stable over time and contributed to higher subjective well-being and prosociality both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Discussion focuses on spirituality as a fundamental character strength and an important aspect of positive development. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Existe en Frege no solo una concepción intencional de la conciencia, sino también uma concepción motivacional de su causalidad, esto es, Frege concibe la idea de una causalidade específica, diferente de la científico-natural, y que tiene como presupuesto la existência de estados intencionales. En tal sentido, existe un interesante punto de contacto entre Frege y Husserl.

Sobre la base de la relación con los conceptos de existencia y realidad, el artículo analiza la teoría de los contenidosde- juicio de Anton Marty en tanto irrealia y truth-makers. Partiendo de su debate con el ‘psicologismo’ y el ‘a-psicologismo’, mostramos la originalidad y la tensión de su posición, que intenta de articular el contenido- de-juicio con la inmanencia del acto intencional y la trascendencia de la objetividad, a partir de los conceptos de co-percepción e intencionalidad.

In this chapter, we will offer a sketch of the state of the art as concerns existing accounts of virtue acquisition in relation to automaticity. In particular, we will focus on the so-called “skill model,” which we aim to improve by questioning its rather common underlying dualistic picture of the mind. Then we will propose an account of skillful emotions by identifying the features that make them both automatic and embedded in an intelligent practice. Finally, we will show how this (...) view can help the skill model by offering a better description of emotion shaping in virtue acquisition. By doing so, we will contend that emotions contribute autonomously and actively to the skillfulness of the habits in which they are embedded. (shrink)

El tema de la participación de la escuela de Brentano en la polémica en torno al psicologismo no se deja reducir a una simple y única pregunta, ni se puede responder con una simple y única respuesta, pues presenta una marcada diversidad tanto desde el punto de vista sistemático como histórico, componiéndose de diferentes polémicas que tienen un cierto grado de independencia.

ABSTRACT A review of the book by Gottfried Gabriel and Sven Schlotter Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie (Münster, Mentis, 2017).

Critical Study. Gottfried Gabriel: Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn. Brill/ Schöningh, 2022.

En su obra principal “Crítica de la razón pura”, Kant deja clara su intención de no solo investigar las cualidades epistemológicas del ser humano, sino también de fundamentar las ciencias naturales. Principalmente la física y las matemáticas. El libro “Fundamentaciones metafísicas de las ciencias naturales” continua este proyecto. En su prólogo se excluye aún más a ambas ciencias, al catalogarlas como las únicas portadoras de conocimientos sintéticos a priori. Los problemas surgen con la “Crítica del Juicio” y su apartado “Crítica (...) del Juicio teleológico”. Aquí, Kant intenta legitimar la biología como ciencia natural sin invadir el campo ocupado por la física matemática. El resultado es una biología que porta conocimientos necesarios pero que al mismo tiempo no puede brindarnos leyes constitutivas de la naturaleza. Esta nueva ciencia natural se torna irreconciliable con el sistema de las ciencias naturales que Kant mismo había planteado en sus libros anteriores. (shrink)

Volume XVIII Special Issue: Gian-Carlo Rota and The End of Objectivity, 2019 Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Gabriele Baratelli, Stefania Centrone, Giovanna C. Cifoletti, Jean-Marie Coquard, Steven Crowell, Deborah De Rosa, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Agnese Di Riccio, Aurélien Djian, (...) Yuval Dolev, Mirja Hartimo, Burt C. Hopkins, Talia Leven, Ah Hyun Moon, Luis Niel, Fabrizio Palombi, Mario Ariel González Porta, Gian-Carlo Rota, Michael Roubach, Franco Trabattoni and Michele Vagnetti. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors electronically via e-mail attachments. (shrink)

Volume XVIII Special Issue: Gian-Carlo Rota and The End of Objectivity, 2019 Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Gabriele Baratelli, Stefania Centrone, Giovanna C. Cifoletti, Jean-Marie Coquard, Steven Crowell, Deborah De Rosa, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Agnese Di Riccio, Aurlien Djian, (...) Yuval Dolev, Mirja Hartimo, Burt C.Hopkins, Talia Leven, Ah Hyun Moon, Luis Niel, Fabrizio Palombi, Mario Ariel Gonzlez Porta, Gian-Carlo Rota, Michael Roubach, Franco Trabattoni and Michele Vagnetti. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors ([email protected] and [email protected]) electronically via e-mail attachments. (shrink)

Addressing one of the most difficult conceptual topics in the study of classical Hinduism, Ariel Glucklich presents a rigorous phenomenology of dharma, or order. The work moves away from the usual emphasis on symbols and theoretical formulations of dharma as a religious and moral norm. Instead, it focuses on images that emerge from the basic experiential interaction of the body in its spatial and temporal contexts, such as the sensation of water on the skin during the morning purification, or (...) the physical manipulation of the bride during the marriage ritual. Images of dharma are examined in myths, rituals, art, and even the physical landscape of the Hindu world. The varied and contingent experiences of dharma infuse it with a meaning that transcends a false analytical distinction from adharma, or chaos. Glucklich shows that when dharma is experienced by means of living images, it becomes inescapably temporal, and therefore inseparable from adharma. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

Our knowledge about the world is often expressed by generic sentences, yet their meanings are far from clear. This book provides answers to central problems concerning generics: what do they mean? Which factors affect their interpretation? How can one reason with generics? Cohen proposes that the meanings of generics are probability judgments, and shows how this view accounts for many of their puzzling properties, including lawlikeness. Generics are evaluated with respect to alternatives. Cohen argues that alternatives are induced by the (...) kind as well as by the predicated property, and thus provides a uniform account of the varied interpretations of generics. He studies the formal properties of alternatives and provides a compositional account of their derivation by focus and presupposition. Cohen uses his semantics of generics to provide a formal characterization of adequate default reasoning, and proves some desirable results of this formalism. (shrink)